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NOTE
IMPROVING GENERIC DRUG APPROVAL
AT THE FDA
Kathleen Craddock*
Generic drugs are the store-brand cereal of the drug world. While they lack
the vibrant colors of and exciting commercials behind name brands, generics are
still effective. Most importantly, for some people, they make the difference be-
tween accessing essential treatment and going without. Getting generics to market
as quickly as possible means fewer people will cut pills in half or skip doses to save
money, which also saves billions of dollars across the U.S. health system.1 Because
a new generic does not offer lifesaving changes for people with rare or complicated
diseases, generics lack the “cultural capture of rhetoric about saving lives by get-
ting new drugs to patients more quickly.”2
But generics are the drugs that many of us take every day. Generic drugs’
ease of entry into the market impacts whether everyday Americans can afford
health insurance and access healthcare.
Better recognition of these benefits combined with insurer buy-in to the Food
and Drug Administration’s (“FDA”) generic approval program has the potential
to improve health while reducing systemic costs. This Note proposes three changes
to the current approval process for generic drugs at FDA. First, the FDA should
conduct a regular study to identify drugs that feature the biggest negative medica-
tion adherence impact.3 Second, the FDA should allow insurers to sponsor generic
approval for those drugs. Third, the FDA should be required to engage healthcare
stakeholders beyond generic drug makers and manufacturers when it negotiates
generic drug approval funding with industry.
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1. See Margaret A. Hamburg M.D., Comm’r of Food & Drugs, Food & Drug Admin.,
Remarks as Delivered at the GPhA Annual Meeting 3 (Feb. 22, 2013).
2. Donald W. Light et al., Institutional Corruption of Pharmaceuticals and the Myth of
Safe and Effective Drugs, 14 J. OF L. MED. & ETHICS 590, 595 (2013).
3. Medication adherence measures whether patients take medication as prescribed by
their medical providers without skipping or reducing doses. See, e.g., Aaron S. Kesselheim &
Jonathan J. Darrow, Hatch-Waxman Turns 30: Do We Need a Re-Designed Approach for the
Modern Era? 15 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 293, 295 n.6 (2015).
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INTRODUCTION
Scientific breakthroughs that make deadly diseases treatable are under-
standably exciting and newsworthy. However, preventing runaway health
costs and improving medication access may be more valuable to under-
resourced communities and to the country overall. The Affordable Care Act
was premised on this idea that we can afford to extend health care to more
people if we can slow the growth of healthcare costs.4 One way to slow
healthcare cost growth is to embrace generics drugs. These drugs are sold at
much lower prices than branded drugs for a number of reasons including
their lack of patent protection.5
The FDA is charged with reviewing prescription drugs for safety and
effectiveness.6 FDA’s drug review is housed in the Center for Drug Evalua-
tion and Research, which “perform[s] an essential public health task by mak-
ing sure that safe and effective drugs are available to improve the health of
people in the United States.”7 FDA’s budget is supported by a mix of Con-
gressional appropriations and user fees.8 The FDA has four separate “user
4. Better Care, Smarter Spending, Healthier People: Improving Our Health Care Delivery
System, CTR. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERV., https://www.cms.gov/Newsroom/MediaRe
leaseDatabase/Fact-sheets/2015-Fact-sheets-items/2015-01-26.html (Jan. 26, 2015).
5. Generic Drugs: Questions and Answers, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda
.gov/Drugs/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/QuestionsAnswers/ucm100100.htm#q4 (last vis-
ited Mar. 8, 2018).
6. About FDA: What We Do, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/About
FDA/WhatWeDo/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2018).
7. About the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http:/
/www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProductsandTobacco/CDER/de
fault.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2018).
8. See Margaret Gilhooley, Drug User Fee Reform: The Problem of Capture and a Sunset,
and the Relevance of Priorities and the Deficit, 41 N.M. L. REV. 327 passim (2011) (arguing the
balance of FDA funding should shift more towards appropriations and away from user fees).
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fee” programs where industry applicants for FDA approval pay FDA fees
for processing applications: branded drugs (the Prescription Drug User Fee
Act (“PDUFA”)), medical devices, generic drugs (the Generic Drug User
Fee Act (“GDUFA”)), and biosimilar drugs.9 This Note will focus on
branded and generic drugs. Branded drugs are those drugs with patent and
regulatory protection that often appear in commercials, such as Prilosec and
Claritin.10 Conversely, generic drugs are the un-branded versions that ap-
pear after the branded drugs have lost patent and regulatory protection, like
omeprazole and loratadine.11
The user fee programs are reauthorized every five years in a compre-
hensive FDA reauthorization package.12 The legislative language is accom-
panied by additional detail in documents called “Commitment Letters,”
negotiated between the FDA and each relevant industry.13 The Commit-
ment Letters go beyond the broad legislative language, such as specifying
the communication protocols between the FDA and industry while a drug
application is pending.14 Generic drugs are a new addition to this struc-
ture.15 The generic user fee program started in 2012 and was recently
reauthorized for the first time as part of the FDA Reauthorization Act of
2017.16
Generics provide savings for consumers in both co-pays and out-of-
pocket costs, as well as for third-party payers.17 In today’s world of high
health insurance deductibles and co-pays, cost has a growing impact on
9. Zachary Brennan, Regulatory Explainer: FDA User Fee Reauthorizations from 2018 to
2022, REG. AFF. PROF. SOC’Y (Aug. 21, 2017), http://www.raps.org/Regulatory-Focus/News/
2017/08/21/28282/Regulatory-Explainer-FDA-User-Fee-Reauthorizations-From-2018-to-
2022/.
10. See FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., ORANGE BOOK: APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS WITH THERAPEU-
TIC EQUIVALENCE EVALUATIONS (2017), https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/ob/index
.cfm [hereinafter ORANGE BOOK].
11. Omeprazole is the generic version of Prilosec, and loratadine is the generic version
of Claritin. See ORANGE BOOK, supra note 10.
12. Food & Drug. Admin. Reauthorization Act of 2017, 21 U.S.C. §§ 292-393 (2012).
13. See Brennan, supra note 9.
14. See FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GDUFA II COMMITMENT LETTER: GDUFA REAUTHORIZA-
TION PERFORMANCE GOALS AND PROGRAM ENHANCEMENTS FISCAL YEARS 2018-2022, at 20 (2016)
[hereinafter GDUFA II LETTER]; FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., PDUFA COMMITMENT LETTER:
REAUTHORIZATION PERFORMANCE GOALS AND PROCEDURES FISCAL YEARS 2018 THROUGH 2022, http://
www.fda.gov/downloads/ForIndustry/UserFees/PrescriptionDrugUserFee/UCM511438.pdf
[hereinafter PDUFA LETTER].
15. Patrick O’Leary, Funding the FDA: Assessing the User Fee Provisions of the FDA Safety
and Innovation Act of 2012, 50 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 239, 247 (2013).
16. Brennan, supra note 9.
17. Id.
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whether patients take the drugs their doctors prescribe.18 Currently, retail
prices for generic drugs for Medicare Part D patients are seventy-five to
ninety percent lower than their brand-name counterparts.19 High drug costs
can cause elderly patients to take less than their prescribed medication dose
or to not fill their prescriptions at all.20 Since Medicare is not permitted to
negotiate prices, market pressure brought about by cheaper generic alterna-
tives to brand drugs may be the best way to ensure drug prices are afforda-
ble for seniors.21
The FDA has made significant strides to improve generic drug ap-
proval, but the generic drug industry would benefit from having public
health advocates in its corner. Branded drug companies can afford to advo-
cate for themselves in front of the FDA, but the generic drug industry runs
on much tighter budgets.22 The industry also requires additional sources of
funds to pay the FDA’s user fees to ensure the stability of generic drug
approval going forward. This progress can be protected and furthered by
three modifications to the current generic user fee program: identifying
particular public health needs, sourcing additional funds for user fees, and
engaging a broader healthcare stakeholder community.
First, the FDA should conduct a biennial series of studies of medication
adherence, health outcomes, and overall cost of care based on generic availa-
bility for specific drugs widely used by vulnerable patient populations with
18. Kesselheim & Darrow, supra note 3, at 317  (citing Thomas S. Rector & Patricia J.
Venus, Do Drug Benefits Help Medicare Beneficiaries Afford Prescribed Drugs?, 23 HEALTH AFF.
213, 219 (2004)) (survey of 1,500 elderly Medicare beneficiaries with chronic health condi-
tions, finding 32% opted not to fill prescription or take prescribed medication dose due to
high out-of-pocket costs).
19. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-16-706, GENERIC DRUGS UNDER MEDICARE:
PART D GENERIC DRUG PRICES DECLINED OVERALL, BUT SOME HAD EXTRAORDINARY PRICE INCREASES 1
(2016).
20. Kesselheim & Darrow, supra note 3, at 317 (citing Rector & Venus, supra note 18, at
219).
21. LARS NOAH, LAW, MEDICINE, AND MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY: CASES AND MATERIALS 866 (3d
ed. 2012) (explaining that the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 included a provision
prohibiting the federal government from negotiating with drug makers when the Act created
Part D Medicare coverage for prescription drugs).
22. Neeraj Sood et. al, Follow the Money: The Flow of Funds in the Pharmaceutical Distri-
bution System, HEALTH AFF. (June 13, 2017), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/
hblog20170613.060557/full/. This Note does not analyze the possible implications of alleged
antitrust violations in the form of price fixing in the generic industry or what is otherwise
known about generic industry structure and profitability. For more on this developing issue,
see Charles Lane, Probe Into Generic Drug Price Fixing Set To Widen, NPR (Mar. 7, 2018),
https://www.npr.org/2018/03/07/590217561/probe-into-generic-drug-price-fixing-set-to-
widen; see also Robert Freeman, Allegations of Generic Drug Price Fixing Are Troubling, THE
HILL (Mar. 13, 2018), http://thehill.com/opinion/healthcare/378165-allegations-of-drug-price-
fixing-are-troubling.
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chronic conditions to identify drugs most in need of generic competition.
Second, Congress should amend Title III of the FDA Reauthorization Act
of 2017 (GDUFA II) to allow insurers to sponsor generic entry for drugs
that improve health outcomes for vulnerable populations. This additional
funding would provide needed support to help generics target the branded
drugs where competition is most critical.  Finally, the FDA should build on
its recent efforts by committing to regularly engaging public health advo-
cates in reauthorizing the FDA’s generic drug approval program.23
This Note first provides an overview of the FDA drug approval process
and the introduction of user fees from drug makers as a major source of the
FDA’s funding. This Note then discusses the successes of user fee funding
in speeding branded drug approvals at the FDA and the approval backlog
that has dogged generics. Next, this Note provides a set of three proposals
to improve generic drug approval. Finally, this Note describes how user fees
from generic drug makers have not fixed approval backlogs as rapidly as
user fees from branded drug makers did and compares the most recent
reauthorizations and stakeholder communities for branded drug fee funding
and generic drug fee funding, demonstrating the need for the proposed
improvements.
I. BACKGROUND ON GENERIC DRUG APPROVAL
Prior to 1984, generic drugs struggled to obtain FDA approval because
of the prohibitive costs generics incurred to prove that their drugs were
safe.24 Only nineteen percent of FDA-approved drugs were generics.25
Showing safety and efficacy through clinical trials was too costly when a
firm did not stand to earn the typically high profits available to the first
branded drug on the market, referred to as “pioneer drugs.”26
In 1984, Congress passed the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term
Restoration Act (commonly referred to as “Hatch-Waxman”).27 This law
allows generic drug makers to piggyback on the pioneer drug’s clinical trials
23. See Administering the Hatch-Waxman Amendments: Ensuring a Balance Between
Innovation and Access, Request for Comments, 82 Fed. Reg. 28,493 (June 22, 2017) (seeking
input from interested stakeholders on regulatory and legal obstacles to vigorous generic drug
competition).
24. Rebecca Eisenberg & John R. Thomas, Patents and Regulatory Exclusivity in the U.S,
in FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. LAW COURSEPACK, 6 (Univ. Mich. Law Sch. 2014).
25. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-12-371R, DRUG PRICING: RESEARCH ON SAVINGS
FROM GENERIC DRUG USE 2 (2012).
26. Eisenberg & Thomas, supra note 24, at 6.
27. SUSAN THAUL & JUDITH A. JOHNSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42540, PROPOSED FDA
USER FEE ACTS: GENERIC DRUG USER FEE AMENDMENTS OF 2012 AND BIOSIMILAR USER FEE ACT OF
2012, at 5 (2012).
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establishing safety and efficacy.28 Under Hatch-Waxman, a generic drug
maker may use an abbreviated new drug application (“ANDA”), instead of
the more complicated new drug application (“NDA”). The ANDA process
allows generic drug makers to get FDA approval when the drug maker
proves their formulation is bioequivalent to the branded drug and will have
the same use conditions, active ingredients, administration route, strength,
and labeling as its branded counterpart.29 Proving bioequivalence is much
simpler and less costly than proving safety and efficacy for a new drug,
providing particular savings in reduced need for extended clinical trials.30
Branded drugs can charge high prices while under patent or “regulatory
exclusivity” protection, laws which protect their status as the only FDA-
approved producer of a particular drug.31 Patents on most inventions expire
after twenty years, but branded drugs lose some of that time while the drug
goes through clinical trials and regulatory review.32 Hatch-Waxman pro-
vides branded drugs with patent term extensions of up to five years to
recoup the lost time, capping the extension at fourteen years of patent pro-
tection after FDA approval.33 Regulatory exclusivities that bar generic en-
try may apply as well, such as seven years of market exclusivity for “orphan”
drugs treating a condition impacting fewer than 200,000 people in the U.S.
and six months of market exclusivity for branded drugs that complete
clinical trials to certify the drug for use in pediatrics.34
While generic drugs would not earn high profits from patent-based ex-
clusivity, the law created a non-patent exclusivity period specifically for
generics. Under Hatch-Waxman, the first generic firm to successfully chal-
lenge the branded drug’s patent protection under a certification that it is
“invalid or will not be infringed” has 180 days to exclusively market its
generic before the FDA will approve another generic competitor for that
product.35 Hatch-Waxman created this incentive to compensate generics for
the expense of patent litigation against branded drug firms sparked by the
noninfringement certification and to encourage generic entry as soon as
patent and regulatory exclusivities allow.36  By 2013, nearly eighty-five per-
cent of all prescriptions filled in the U.S. were generic, and generic drugs
28. Id.
29. Eisenberg & Thomas, supra note 24, at 7 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)).
30. See Kesselheim & Darrow, supra note 3, at 302.
31. Eisenberg & Thomas, supra note 24, at 12-19.
32. Id. at 5.
33. Id. at 5-6.
34. Id. at 13, 18.
35. Id. at 7 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(7)(vii)(IV)).
36. Kesselheim & Darrow, supra note 3, at 326.
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saved consumers approximately $1 trillion dollars in health care costs.37
This was due to generics’ low retail price, which is on average  “about 25%
of their brand-name counterparts.”38
II. INTRODUCTION OF THE FEE FUNDING MODEL
In the late 1980s, it took the FDA twenty-nine months to approve new
branded drugs, and industry wanted a faster timeline.39  To allow the FDA
to hire more staff and approve drugs more quickly, the branded drug indus-
try agreed to pay the FDA user fees for its drug approval applications.40
The Prescription Drug User Fee Act (“PDUFA”) was enacted in 1992 with
agreements between the FDA, the branded drug industry, and Congress.41
PDUFA promised improved approval times in exchange for industry fund-
ing.42 The agreement contained assurances that fee funding would only be
used “for activities to support the review of human drug applications and
would supplement—rather than replace—funding that Congress appropri-
ated to [the] FDA.”43
PDUFA included a provision requiring reauthorization every five
years.44 Funding from industry took pressure off Congressional appropria-
tions to the FDA.45 For example, between 2012 and 2016, congressionally
appropriated funding for the FDA increased by 9%, but the amount of
money that industry paid the FDA as user fee funding increased over
50%.46 Since the FDA relies so heavily on this funding for its operations
and funding reauthorizations have to be negotiated with industry every five
years to keep the funds flowing, the branded drug industry gained signifi-
cant leverage to set the FDA’s priorities every five years.47  By 2016, “user
fees account[ed] for 42%” of the FDA’s total funding.48  Donald  Light, Joel
37. Hamburg, supra note 1, at 1-2.
38. THAUL & JOHNSON, supra note 27, at 3 (citing U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-
12-371R, supra note 25).
39. SUSAN THAUL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33914, THE PRESCRIPTION DRUG USER FEE
ACT: HISTORY THROUGH THE 2007 PDUFA IV REAUTHORIZATION 1 (2008).
40. Id. at 2.
41. O’Leary, supra note 15, at 241.
42. Id.
43. THAUL & JOHNSON, supra note 27, at 1.
44. See Prescription Drug User Fee Act: Request for Comments, 81 Fed. Reg. 46,929,
46,929-30 (July 19, 2016); Prescription Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA), U.S. FOOD & DRUG AD-
MIN. (last updated Feb. 26, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/ForIndustry/UserFees/Prescription-
DrugUserFee/.
45. See Light et al., supra note 2, at 595.
46. AGATA DABROWSKA & SUSAN THAUL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44576, FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN. BUDGET: FACT SHEET 2 (2016).
47. See Light et al., supra note 2, at 595.
48. DABROWSKA & THAUL, supra note 46, at 3.
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MEA\7-2\MEA205.txt unknown Seq: 8 26-APR-18 11:38
428 Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law [Vol. 7:2
Lexchin, and Jonathan Darrow suggested in the Journal of Law, Medicine &
Ethics that “cultural capture of rhetoric about saving lives by getting new
[branded] drugs to patients more quickly” tilts the balance of power toward
the manufacturers in these negotiations.49
The generic drug industry is described as a fiercely competitive, low-
profit-margin market that “is certainly not for sissies.”50 In The New York
Times, Charles Ornstein and Katie Thomas recently explained that “[a]mid
all the public fury over the escalating costs of brand-name medications, the
price of generic drugs has been falling, raising fears about the profitability
of major generic manufacturers.”51 One study showed manufacturers “make
about three times the gross profits on branded [versus] generic drugs.”52
The top five generic companies are the only companies that hold market
shares above 5%.53 Because profits in the generic drug industry are much
thinner, the generic drug industry would benefit from the ability to lean on
insurer contributions to its FDA approval application costs.  Further, be-
cause there are fewer advocates for generic drugs—likely because the ge-
neric industry has fewer resources to fund patient groups and lobbyists—
emphasizing the public health impact of generic drugs and involving the
public health community in this advocacy would help establish generic
drugs as an important constituency for the FDA.
Furthermore, the United States relies on generics to provide savings in
the health system. A report by the Commonwealth Fund on high health care
spending in the United Sates found that “prices for generic drugs are lower
in the U.S. than in these other countries, whereas prices for brand-name
drugs are much higher.”54 This pricing inversion makes it difficult for the
generic industry to take advantage of the user fee funding model because
their profits are already so low.
49. Light et al., supra note 2, at 595.
50. Eric Palmer, Top 20 Generics Companies by 2014 Revenue, FIERCEPHARMA, http://www
.fiercepharma.com/special-report/top-20-generics-companies-by-2014-revenue (last visited
Mar. 8, 2018).
51. Charles Ornstein & Katie Thomas, Generic Drug Prices Are Falling, but Are Consum-
ers Benefiting?, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 8, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/08/health/gen
eric-drugs-prices-falling.html?smid=tw-nythealth&smtyp=cur.
52. Sood et al., supra note 21 (noting the authors’ perspective that the disparity was
consistent with the patent protection branded drugs enjoy).
53. Palmer, supra note 50.
54. DAVID A. SQUIRES, EXPLAINING HIGH HEALTH CARE SPENDING IN THE UNITED STATES: AN
INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON OF SUPPLY, UTILIZATION, PRICES, AND QUALITY, 5 (2012), http://www
.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/files/publications/issue-brief/2012/may/1595_squires_ex
plaining_high_hlt_care_spending_intl_brief.pdf.
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III. THE PROMISE OF FEE FUNDING FOR GENERICS
The FDA’s branded drug user fee funding program ran for twenty
years before generics received a similar program.55 The branded drug fund-
ing program is known as PDUFA, and its counterpart for generic drug ap-
provals is known as GDUFA.56
PDUFA’s five reauthorizations have progressed smoothly, establishing
significantly faster review times and establishing extensive communication
and coordination between the FDA and the branded drug industry.57
PDUFA I and II created a set of expectations industry could rely on in
communications with regulators, and PDUFA III increased base user fees
to create a sustainable funding structure and post-market surveillance pro-
cedures.58 PDUFA IV featured another increase in funding, guidance for
industry on new models of clinical trials, and extension of post-market sur-
veillance.59 PDUFA V created a formal structure of communication during
review of applications with multiple interactions between the FDA and in-
dustry.60 One might have imagined GDUFA could build on this established
framework and hit the ground running. But that is not what happened.
GDUFA was first authorized in 2012, and many hoped that user fee
funding for generics would help combat high drug prices by reducing the
generic approval backlog at the FDA.61 Commissioner Margaret Hamburg
stated the “FDA was drowning in generic applications that arrive at the rate
of almost 1,000 a year, pushing the backlog of ANDAs above 2,500, and
stretching the median time for generic drug approvals to 31 months” before
55. Protecting the Public Heath: Examining FDA’s Initiatives and Priorities - Hearing on
Examining the FDA’s Initiatives and Priorities, Focusing on Protecting the Public Health Before the
S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor, & Pensions, 113th Cong. 8 (2014) (statement of Comm’r
Margaret A. Hamburg, M.D., U.S. Food & Drug Admin.).
56. O’Leary, supra note 15, at 245–46.
57. Jacqueline G. Lampert & David Kendall, Ten Things You Need to Know About the
FDA User Fee Reauthorizations, THIRD WAY, §§ 7-8 (Apr. 20, 2017), http://www.thirdway.org/
primer/ten-things-you-need-to-know-about-the-fda-user-fee-reauthorizations (explaining the
reauthorization process, including the fact that the user fee programs are written with provi-
sions requiring reauthorization of the user fee programs every five years).
58. Prescription Drug User Fee Act: Request for Comments, 81 Fed. Reg. 46,929,
46,931 (July 19, 2016).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Zachary Brennan, Generic Drug Backlog at FDA: A Dive into the Confusing Numbers,
REG. AFF. PROF. SOC’Y (Nov. 1, 2016), http://www.raps.org/Regulatory-Focus/News/2016/11/
01/26106/Generic-Drug-Backlog-at-FDA-A-Dive-Into-the-Confusing-Numbers/; Prioritizing
Public Health: The FDA’s Role in the Generic Drug Marketplace: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Agric., Rural Dev. & Fed. Drug Admin., & Related Agencies of the S. Comm. on Appropriations
(2016) (statement of Janet Woodcock, Director, Ctr. for Drug Evaluation & Research,
USDA), https://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Testimony/ucm522119.htm.
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the FDA took in user fee funding from generic drugs.62 The FDA hoped
GDUFA I would “ensure consumers continue to receive the significant ben-
efits offered by generic drugs which provided more than $824 billion dollars
in savings to the nation’s health care system in the last decade alone” and
reduce the expense of bringing products to market, thereby reducing costs
to patients and payors.63 A number of very costly drugs, earning over $1
billion in revenue per year such as Singulair, the asthma medication, would
lose their patent eligibility by 2015, contributing to the hope that the new
generic fee funding program would allow generics to quickly provide a less
costly alternative for these drugs.64
IV. THE FDA BEGINS ACCEPTING USER FEE FUNDING
FOR GENERIC DRUGS
The Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act, the
2012 reauthorization of the FDA user fee programs and updates to FDA
practices, included the inaugural version of GDUFA and became law on
July 9, 2012.65 Collecting user fees for generic drugs would allow the FDA
to begin clearing the buildup of pending unacknowledged or unapproved
generic drug applications. In GDUFA I, the FDA agreed to act on 90% of
generic drug applications (“ANDAs”) that were submitted in 2017 within
ten months.66
However, for generic applications in the “backlog,” specifically those
applications submitted prior to July 9, 2012, the FDA only committed to
take a first action on 90% of them by the end of 2017.67 These backlogged
applications did not receive “goal dates” by which a manufacturer can expect
the FDA to have acted on its application.68 Even if the FDA’s first action
on any of these application asked the manufacturer to amend the applica-
tion, that new submission still did not receive a goal date, creating an un-
predictable and frustrating process.69 ANDAs submitted in 2013 and 2014
also did not receive goal dates, and the FDA only committed to “maintain
62. Hamburg, supra note 1, at 3.
63. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GDUFA COMMITMENT LETTER: HUMAN GENERIC DRUG PER-
FORMANCE GOALS AND PROCEDURES FISCAL YEARS 2013 THROUGH 2017 1–2 (2012), http://www.fda
.gov/downloads/ForIndustry/UserFees/GenericDrugUserFees/UCM282505.pdf.
64. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-12-371R, supra note 25, at 2 n.8.
65. Protecting the Public Heath, supra note 55, at 8.
66. GDUFA II LETTER, supra note 14, at 4.
67. Generic Drug User Fees: Request for Comments, 81 Fed. Reg. 66,035, 66,036
(Sept. 26, 2016).
68. See GDUFA II LETTER, supra note 14.
69. See Generic Drug User Fees: Request for Comments, 81 Fed. Reg. 66,035, 66,036.
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pre-GDUFA levels of productivity.”70  The lack of deadlines delayed pro-
gress while incoming applications mounted.
GDUFA’s struggle to improve productivity starkly differs from the ini-
tial changes brought about by PDUFA. Approval times for branded drugs
quickly reduced after PDUFA first became law in 1993.71 PDUFA I’s goal
was to reduce median application review “from 27 months in FY 1993 to 12
months in 1998.”72  The new funding for PDUFA I allowed the FDA to
hire more review staff, and the FDA well exceeded PDUFA I’s goal, reduc-
ing review times to six months by 1998.73
This marked variation between the initial success of PDUFA and
GDUFA might be traced to the fact that efforts to reduce approval times
for generic drugs started at even more of a deficit. During negotiations for
the initial GDUFA, median application review times for generic applica-
tions averaged thirty-one-months and had to compete with 2,500 backlog-
ged applications.74
While PDUFA was able to reduce approval times for branded drugs,
after GDUFA I was enacted, the approval delays for generic drugs actually
lengthened. According to the Association for Accessible Medicines,75 me-
dian ANDA approval time increased to between forty-eight and fifty
months in 2015, amid an increasing backlog of pending requests.76 Only
about 1,550 generics were approved between 2013 when the FDA started
taking in GDUFA I funding and 2016.77 Some of the generics awaiting
approval in 2012 were not considered part of the official backlog.78 They
were excluded from the backlog total because the FDA asked the manufac-
turer for an amended application or took a similar action.79 Critics suggest
70. Id.
71. THAUL & JOHNSON, supra note 27, at 1.
72. Id. at 1.
73. Id. at 3.
74. Id. at 5.
75. The Association for Accessible Medicines is the primary trade group for generic
and biosimilar manufacturers and was known as the Generic Pharmaceutical Association
until February 14, 2017. Generic and Biosimilar Manufacturers Launch New Brand & Campaign
to Expand Access to Medicines, PR NEWSWIRE (Feb. 14, 2017), https://www.prnewswire.com/
news-releases/generic-and-biosimilar-manufacturers-launch-new-brand—campaign-to-ex
pand-access-to-medicines-300406969.html.
76. Generic Pharmaceutical Association, Comment Letter on Generic Drug User Fees
6 (July 15, 2015), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-2012-N-0882-0023.
77. Sydney Lupkin, EpiPen Controversy Fuels Concern Over Generic Drug Approval Back-
log, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Sept. 6, 2016), http://khn.org/news/epipen-controversy-fuels-con
cerns-over-generic-drug-approval-backlog/.
78. Id.
79. Lupkin, supra note 77 (quoting an FDA statement that “[m]ost applications from
the backlog will need to come back to FDA for additional review due to deficiencies in the
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that the exclusion of these rejected applications meant that in late 2016, “the
agency [had] only approved about half the backlogged generics that were
awaiting approval in 2012.”80 The FDA made some headway, but “a flood of
new applications . . . steadily added to the demand.”81
The FDA set the amount of money it would collect from industry par-
ticipants in GDUFA I based on projections that industry would submit 750
ANDAs per year because ANDAs are “the primary workload driver of the
program.”82 However, the FDA received an average of 1000 applications per
year over the first four years.83  According to one industry participant, four
years after GDUFA I, the FDA “ha[d] not yet fully staffed its inspection
teams to adequately inspect the numerous facilities responsible for manufac-
turing generic [final dosage formulas] and [active pharmaceutical ingredi-
ents] for sale in the U.S.”84 The FDA’s staff explained that facility
inspections were delayed because of a lack of resources and expected “the
percentage of inspections conducted to improve with additional funding
from user fees from manufacturers of generic drugs.”85 GDUFA II in-
creased user fees by nearly $200 million from about $293 million annually
in GDUFA I up to $493 million annually in GDUFA II to account for the
underestimation of its workload.86
Ensuring the FDA has sufficient funding to approve generic drug ap-
plications as quickly as possible has benefits across the healthcare system.
Each day with no or few generic alternatives on the market means an addi-
tional day where patients, insurers, and the government pay high branded
drug prices. The Association for Accessible Medicines cited a survey of its
members estimating $3.7 billion lost in healthcare savings “due to first ge-
submissions.”); Ed Silverman, FDA Still Struggling with Backlog of Generic Drug Applications,
STAT (Mar. 2, 2016), https://www.statnews.com/pharmalot/2016/03/02/fda-generic-drugs/
(noting figures where FDA framed success as first review of an application, instead of
approvals).
80. Lupkin, supra note 77.
81. Id.
82. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GDUFA II FEE STRUCTURE SUMMARY 1 (2016), http://www
.fda.gov/downloads/ForIndustry/UserFees/GenericDrugUserFees/UCM525236.pdf.
83. Id.
84. Breckenridge Pharmaceutical, Inc., Comment Letter on Docket No. FDA-2012-N-
0882: Generic Drug User Fees, 2 (Nov. 16, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D
=FDA-2012-N-0882-0057.
85. DEP ’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV.’S OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., OEI-01-13-00600,
FDA HAS MADE PROGRESS ON OVERSIGHT AND INSPECTIONS OF MANUFACTURERS OF GENERIC DRUGS
10 (May 2015).
86. Zachary Brennan, GDUFA II Performance Goals: 8-Month Priority Reviews, REG. AFF.
PROF. SOC’Y (Oct. 17, 2016), http://www.raps.org/Regulatory-Focus/News/2016/10/17/26013/
Updated-GDUFA-II-Performance-Goals-8-Month-Priority-Reviews-More-Timely-Corre
spondence/.
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neric approval delays.”87 Because the 180-day exclusivity period is a critical
revenue window for the first generic maker on the market under the Hatch-
Waxman Act, any approval delay is costly for the generic manufacturer as
well.88
The FDA has made significant progress in generic drug approval over
the last two years and has “met or exceeded all performance goals” an-
nounced in the original GDUFA Commitment Letter,89 and the FDA
under Commissioner Scott Gottlieb has taken interesting steps to improve
generic drug competition with branded drugs.90 To help ensure these im-
provements persist, the FDA should help identify the particular generic
drugs that would drive the biggest public health impact and systemic sav-
ings. Identifying these drugs would demonstrate the incentive for insurers
to sponsor applications for more generic competition for those drugs.
V. PROPOSALS TO FIX THE SYSTEM
Some argue that funding the FDA “entirely . . . by taxpayers-as-con-
sumers” is the only way for the agency to be truly accountable to the coun-
try’s interests.91 If funding comes from the entire country’s tax base and is
appropriated by Congress according to the spectrum of constituent needs,
the agency will be funded by a more balanced and public-interest-minded
set of interests in comparison to the self-serving interests driving industry
funding. Professor Gilhooley recommends “at a minimum, limiting user fee
support to half of the cost of the drug approval program, with the rest
coming from government appropriations.”92
Professor Sharona Hoffman, who focusses on drug shortages in the ge-
neric market, calls for expanding the FDA’s public health powers to shape
the market,93 suggesting public health laws adopted to fight pandemics and
natural disasters could provide a model for legislation allowing the FDA to
87. See Generic Pharmaceutical Association, supra note 76, at 7.
88. See, e.g., Eisenberg & Thomas, supra note 24, at 9; Generic Drug User Fees: Re-
quest for Comments, 81 Fed. Reg. 66,035, 66,037 (Sept. 26, 2016).
89. Hearing on Generic Drug User Fee Amendments: Accelerating Patient Access to Generic
Drugs Before the S. Comm. On Health, Educ., Labor, & Pensions, 114th Cong. (2016) (testimony
of Janet Woodcock, M.D., Dir. of the Ctr. for Drug Evaluation & Research, U.S. Food &
Drug Admin.).
90. Administering the Hatch-Waxman Amendments: Ensuring a Balance Between In-
novation and Access, Request for Comments, 82 Fed. Reg. 28,495 (June 22, 2017). See infra
Sec. VI.A.1 for a discussion of the FDA’s recent steps.
91. Light et al., supra note 2, at 597.
92. Gilhooley, supra note 8, at 329–30.
93. Sharona Hoffman, The Drugs Stop Here: A Public Health Framework to Address the
Drug Shortage Crisis, 67 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 1, 12–13 (2012).
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place requirements on the generic industry to avoid shortages.94 She sug-
gests penalizing manufacturers who do not keep up with demand and cause
shortages, and rewarding manufacturers who meet demand during drug
shortages.95 While that proposal may be effective in the short-term or in
relation to a specific shortage crisis, penalizing manufacturers that are strug-
gling to produce sufficient drug quantities would likely remove resources
from the comparatively under-resourced generics industry.96  Adding fund-
ing from ‘sponsors’ and potentially boosting Congressional appropriations
as a response to public health engagement can do more to both alleviate
shortages and improve drug access. Sufficient Congressional appropriations,
though not always stable and reliable, would be ideal, but the fee-funding
model is becoming entrenched, having expanded to other FDA programs.97
Therefore, creating another funding stream to support generic drug ap-
proval at the FDA would have the advantage of both allowing FDA to hire
more staff focused on generics and create more sophisticated processes to
ensure rapid approvals. Another funding stream would also allow later
GDUFA negotiations to focus on applying the achievements and structures
from PDUFA to the generic approval process instead of being consumed by
disputes among generic industry participants over the division of user fee
obligations within the industry. Creating another funding stream should be
accomplished in three steps: 1) identifying the most effective place to target
those funds 2) creating a formal program to direct the funds’ use, and 3)
codifying the FDA’s new efforts to ask public health stakeholders to iden-
tify additional barriers to effective generic drug development and approval.
First, the FDA should conduct a biennial series of studies of medication
adherence,98 health outcomes, and overall cost of care based on generic
availability for specific drugs widely used by vulnerable patient populations
with chronic conditions. This study can be used to identify branded drugs
that are most in need of generic alternatives.
This proposal was inspired by an article written by Professor Margaret
Gilhooley, a former attorney in the FDA’s Office of Chief Counsel and a
retired Professor of Law at Seton Hall Law School.99 Professor Gilhooley’s
94. See id. at 12–16.
95. See id. at 13, 17.
96. Ornstein & Thomas, supra note 51.
97. Lampert & Kendall, supra note 57.
98. Medication adherence is a measure of whether patients take medication as pre-
scribed by their medical providers, without skipping or reducing doses. See, e.g., Kesselheim
& Darrow, supra note 3, at 295 n.6.
99. Gilhooley, supra note 8, at 327 (calling for a study to determine “the extent to
which public health has improved because of the faster approval of drugs made possible by
the user fee system”).
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idea of tying drug approval timelines to public health impact is particularly
critical for generics used by low-income patients with chronic conditions. In
combination with this narrowed focus on this vulnerable and costly popula-
tion and two additional steps, (1) insurer support for fee funding and (2)
engagement with the public health community, the FDA can ensure a suc-
cessful and sustainable generic drug approval program going forward.100
These proposed studies will build on earlier research101 to pinpoint
brand drugs where generic competition would serve a triple aim: helping
vulnerable patient populations achieve better health by being less likely to
skip costly prescribed medications, save the healthcare system money by
reducing preventable negative outcomes from improperly treated chronic
conditions, and save insurers money in providing drug coverage. Patient
failure to take medication as prescribed can lead to negative outcomes like
“stroke in hypertensive patients, higher viral load in patients with HIV, and
hospitalization and mortality in patients with heart failure.”102 Treatment
for these negative outcomes is significantly more resource-intensive than
adhering to the prescribed medication regimen and leads to increased costs
across the health system.103 Identifying the drugs patients are most likely to
skip or take at a reduced dose because of cost and the resulting systemic
outcomes will highlight specific drugs where lowered cost through adding
generic alternatives will do the most good.
Second, Congress should amend Title III of the FDA Reauthorization
Act of 2017 (“GDUFA II”) to allow insurers to sponsor generic entry for
drugs that the proposed studies show improve health outcomes for vulnera-
ble populations. Sponsored drugs that meet these standards would qualify
for priority review as defined by the FDA’s Center for Drug Evaluation and
Research.104 This amendment could take the FDA’s findings from its cur-
rent generic outreach efforts in combination with these proposals and incor-
porate them into the 2022 reauthorization of the FDA’s user fee
100. Id. at 329.
101. See, e.g., Rector & Venus, supra note 18, at 219 (finding cost-related medication
nonadherence among elderly adults with chronic conditions); Public Citizen, Comment Let-
ter on Administering the Hatch-Waxman Amendments (Sept. 19, 2017), https://www.regula
tions.gov/document?D=FDA-2017-N-3615-0078 (describing a study that found the U.S.
ranked worst out of eleven developed countries for medication nonadherence based on cost).
102. Kesselheim & Darrow, supra note 3, at 316
103. Id. (explaining that medication nonadherence may cost the U.S. health system
more than $100 billion per year “due to complications that could have been prevented.”).
104. CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, MANUAL OF POLICIES AND PROCEDURES, 5240.3
REV. 3-4, “PRIORITIZATION OF THE REVIEW OF ORIGINAL ANDAS, AMENDMENTS AND SUPPLEMENTS”
(2017). The Center for Drug Evaluation and Research is the division of the FDA that is
primarily responsible for drug approval.
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programs.105 Generic drugs need both credit for the public health impact of
medication affordability and supplemental funding to achieve FDA review
parity with pioneer drugs. The proposed study provides the public health
impact data and the supplemental insurer funding provides the needed sup-
port to help generics target the branded drugs where competition is most
needed.
Third, generic drugs need additional engagement from public health
and consumer advocates, insurers, and others with incentives to reduce costs
in the system. Recent FDA initiatives to seek input on improving generic
drug availability have generated enthusiastic responses.106 When the FDA
held a public meeting on these issues on July 18, 2017, the Agency received
input from a wide variety of healthcare providers, legal experts, indepen-
dent patient advocates, and public health advocates.107 Amending the proce-
dures for generic user fee reauthorization to require the FDA to seek
comment from these groups each time GDUFA is reauthorized will, in
combination with the additional funding, support an effective, medication-
access-oriented program of generic approval at the FDA.
VI. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Both PDUFA and GDUFA were recently reauthorized in August
2017.108 Reauthorizing these programs follows a series of similar steps.
First, after extensive negotiations between the FDA and industry, as well as
meetings with stakeholders, the FDA summarizes the negotiated agree-
ments in documents called Commitment Letters.109 The FDA then holds a
public meeting to review the Commitment Letters and opens the letters for
105. This amendment would most logically come as part of the reauthorization of the
FDA’s user fee programs in 2022 but certainly, the earlier the better. See supra Section II for
a discussion of the regular reauthorization of FDA user fee programs.
106. Administering the Hatch-Waxman Amendments: Ensuring a Balance Between In-
novation and Access, Request for Comments, 82 Fed. Reg. 28,493 (June 22, 2017). Interest-
ingly, these responses included few disease-specific patient advocate groups, which supports
an inference that these disease-specific groups are most typically aligned with and funded by
branded drug manufacturers. See Katie Thomas, More than 80 Percent of Patient Groups Accept
Drug Industry Funds, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/01/
health/patient-groups-drug-industry-money.html.
107. Administering the Hatch-Waxman Amendments, 82 Fed. Reg. at 28,493.
108. FDA Reauthorization Act of 2017, 21 U.S.C. §§ 292-393 (2012). This legislation
includes the sixth reauthorization of PDUFA (PUDFA VI, Title I of the legislation) and the
second reauthorization of GDUFA (GDUFA II, Title III of the legislation).
109. GDUFA Reauthorization Public Meetings, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://wayback.arch
ive-it.org/7993/20170721224529/https://www.fda.gov/ForIndustry/UserFees/GenericDrug
UserFees/default.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2018); Prescription Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA),
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (2017), http://www.fda.gov/ForIndustry/UserFees/PrescriptionDrug
UserFee/default.htm.
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public comment.110 After reviewing comments from negotiators, stakehold-
ers, and the public, the FDA submits the Commitment Letters to Congress
to accompany legislation.111
Based on a review of comments related to those most recent public
meeting, the Commitment Letters and comments for each program’s up-
coming reauthorization suggest disparities between the generic and branded
programs. While part of GDUFA’s struggle to achieve PDUFA’s rapid re-
ductions in review times may be because it is a new program, tight funding
in the generic industry and failure by industry, public health stakeholders,
and the FDA to focus on the public health benefits of generics have created
a serious discrepancy between the two programs.
A. GDUFA II
1. Reauthorization Provisions
Discussions between the FDA and industry for GDUFA II focused on
addressing GDUFA I’s immediate problems, such as making submission
review performance goals more specific, improving communication between
the FDA and industry while ANDAs are under review, and structuring the
fee-funding schedule to better reflect the generic market structure while
allowing the FDA to raise more revenue.112 Leading up to the publication
of the Commitment Letter that set out the FDA’s agreements with industry
on topics including how user fees will be structured and the communica-
tions protocols between the FDA and industry for pending generic drug
applications, the FDA held two public meetings, eight meetings with stake-
holders, and over twenty-five meetings with industry.113
The GDUFA II Commitment Letter focuses on review times, commu-
nication between the FDA and industry, manufacturing facility inspection,
and adjusting the balance of fees between participants in the generic indus-
try.114 The FDA will scrap the tiered goal-date formula that caused trouble
in GDUFA I and set standard ANDA review times at ten months.115 Prior-
ity review will be completed within eight months.116 The priority review is
contingent on complete facility information for manufacturing and testing
110. GDUFA Reauthorization Public Meetings, supra note 109; Prescription Drug User Fee
Act, supra note 109.
111. GDUFA Reauthorization Public Meetings, supra note 109; Prescription Drug User Fee
Act, supra note 109.
112. Generic Drug User Fees: Request for Comments, 81 Fed. Reg. 66,035, 66,036-37
(Sept. 26, 2016).
113. GDUFA Reauthorization Public Meeting, supra note 109.
114. Generic Drug User Fees: Request for Comments, 81 Fed. Reg. at 66,036-38.
115. Id. at 66,036.
116. Id.
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facilities because this “frequently impact[s] ANDA approvability.”117 These
basic issues of approved manufacturing and testing facilities speak to the
low profit margins and fragmentation among industry participants.
Just before Congress passed GDUFA II as part of the FDA
Reauthorization Act of 2017, the FDA made two important regulatory
changes to promote generic competition with branded drugs. First, the
FDA published a list of branded drugs that no longer had patent or regula-
tory exclusivity and still had no approved generic competitor, making it
easier for generic drug makers to identify drugs to produce.118 Second, the
FDA assigned priority review to generic applications for drugs with fewer
than three generic competitors when priority review had previously only
been available for the first generic competitor.119 The FDA also announced
a public meeting to solicit feedback on ways the legal framework around
regulatory and patent exclusivities have been used inappropriately to delay
generic competition and received a significant volume of feedback.120 These
changes make it easier for generic drug manufacturers to identify branded
drugs that need competition and pave the way for more prompt approval of
those competitors. In combination with the additional funding and more
frequent communication between the FDA and industry in GDUFA II,
these changes could go a long way to increasing generic competition in the
drug market.
GDUFA II included important improvements from GDUFA I, includ-
ing increased fees and improved communication between the FDA and the
generic industry. Fees increase significantly in GDUFA II from about $300
million per year to $493.6 million.121 The increase is in part to compensate
for the FDA’s under-estimation of the number of ANDAs that it would be
expected to handle each year in GDUFA I.122 The relative distribution of
responsibility for fee funding is naturally a central issue in the reauthoriza-
tion. It reveals market tightness and supports the need for additional user
fee support from outside sources, particularly insurers, who have a financial
incentive to support lower drug prices.123 For GDUFA II, the “FDA and
117. Id.
118. FDA Tackles Drug Competition to Improve Patient Access, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (June
27, 2017), https://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm564725
.htm.
119. Id.
120. Administering the Hatch-Waxman Amendments: Ensuring a Balance Between In-
novation and Access, Request for Comments, 82 Fed. Reg. 28,493 (June 22, 2017).
121. Brennan, supra note 86.
122. Id.
123. See, e.g., Breckenridge Pharmaceuticals, supra note 84 (objecting to the GDUFA II
proposal to shift more user fees from generic manufacturing facilities to ANDA-holders:
entities which lead the applications for FDA approval).
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industry have agreed to shift the burden more toward annual program
fees[,]” instead of application fees, to smooth revenue between years and
“[m]ore closely align fee responsibility with program costs and fee-paying
ability.”124 The issue with fee-paying ability is not, as with pioneer drugs,
the threat that the companies will put less into research, development, and
advertising. Instead, for generics, it is more about whether generic manufac-
turers will be able to stay in business at all under these increased fees.125
Allowing insurers to contribute user fees will offset some of this pressure.
Communication between the FDA and generics manufacturers during
the application process is much less extensive than between the FDA and
branded drug manufacturers. Branded drug-makers have “a path to approval
that allow[s] them to make adjustments at every stop along the way,”126
while generic drug-makers risk losing their approval timeline when the
FDA requests an amendment to an application.127 GDUFA I attempted to
improve communication between industry and the Agency through the ap-
proval process, keeping industry advised of problems that could be easily
fixed.128 However, “[t]hese enhancements, as  operationalized, did not meet
industry’s expectations and were reportedly commercially disruptive.”129 In
GDUFA II, the FDA will determine whether to accept an ANDA for re-
view within 60 days of submission and within that time period, give appli-
cants a quick-turnaround opportunity to make corrections.130 In GDUFA
II, the FDA committed to continue work through the deadline it set for
response to the generic drug maker if the continued work would “likely
result in an imminent tentative approval that could prevent forfeiture of
180-day exclusivity or an imminent approval.”131
These improvements are important steps to achieving parity between
the generic and branded drug programs at the FDA. When combined with
additional user fee funding from insurers and sustained engagement from
public health advocates, the FDA will be primed to make a significant con-
tribution in reducing costs and improving outcomes in the American health-
care system by taking full advantage of generic drugs’ potential.
124. See Protecting the Public Health, supra note 55.
125. Ornstein & Thomas, supra note 51 (describing earnings difficulties in the generic
industry).
126. Lampert & Kendall, supra note 57, at § 4.
127. Lupkin, supra note 77.
128. Generic Drug User Fees: Request for Comments, 81 Fed. Reg. 66,035, 66,037
(Sept. 26, 2016).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
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2. Comments
The identities of public commenters for the most recent GDUFA
Commitment Letter demonstrate the fragmentation of the generics indus-
try and the minimal engagement from the broader health system, particu-
larly health advocacy groups.
FIGURE 1.132 GDUFA II COMMENTS FROM PUBLIC MEETING
ON COMMITMENT LETTER
Most comments focused on the balance of fees between different indus-
try participants like manufacturers, packagers, and developers.133 Some
comments are from entities that package, manufacture, and develop gener-
ics only for a small number of drugs.134 Others manufacture and package
drugs but do not actually hold the approved generic application and believe
the balance of fees tilts too heavily toward manufacturers and packagers and
away from developers.135 There are no strong constituencies of patient
groups and provider groups pushing the GDUFA negotiators to consider
public health or patient needs, as there is in PDUFA.136  While it is unclear
132. Figure 1 is based on my categorization of comments submitted in response to
Generic Drug User Fees: Request for Comments, 81 Fed. Reg. at 66,035.
133. Generic Drug User Fees: Request for Comments, 81 Fed. Reg. at 66,035.
134. See, e.g., Hanford Pharmaceuticals, Comment Letter on Generic Drug User Fees
(July 13, 2015), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-2012-N-0882-0021.
135. See Catalent Pharma Solutions, Comment Letter on Generic Drug User Fees (July
15, 2015), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-2012-N-0882-0024.
136. Compare Generic Drug User Fees: Request for Comments, 81 Fed. Reg. at 66,036
(containing five comments from health system and consumer groups), with Prescription
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how this patient constituency developed for PDUFA, the branded drug in-
dustry is known to sponsor patient advocacy groups, particularly disease-
specific groups.137
GDUFA II’s goal to approve first generics as soon as possible was ap-
plauded in a comment from the pharmacy chain CVS.138 Another comment
from a small think tank argued that the Veterans Health Administration is
challenged by “remarkable increases in cost in selected generic products”
and expressed hope that faster generic approvals could help.139 Overall,
however, the perspectives of advocates for seniors (who tend to have higher
medical needs), low-income communities, and affordable public health were
missing from the comments. The FDA and Congress would benefit from
hearing from additional public-health minded stakeholders about the need
for improved generic approval times, just as they currently benefit from
hearing from patient advocates for breakthrough therapies.
The only other major health care industry stakeholder engaging in the
GDUFA II comment period was Kaiser Permanente, which emphasized
that “[a]s the frequency of drug shortages has increased, the time for ANDA
approvals has also increased.”140 Kaiser suggested “offering incentives in the
form of fee waivers/discounts and/or fast-track approvals, for generic manu-
facturers to enter market segments most vulnerable to shortages.”141 Waiv-
ing fee funding may be effective to encourage submissions, but given that
the FDA was not able to meet review goals under GDUFA I’s lower fund-
ing scheme, reducing the amount of funding the FDA takes in by waiving
fees will not significantly improve drug availability. Adding insurers as a
funding source for review fees will help ensure the FDA receives the fee
funding necessary to hire staff to improve communication with generic
manufacturers on their applications, conduct facility inspections promptly,
and review applications quickly.
Drug User Fee Act: Request for Comments, 81 Fed. Reg. 46,929, 46,929-30 (July 19, 2016)
(containing twenty-seven comments from health system and consumer or patient advocates).
137. Thomas, supra note 106.
138. CVS, Comment Letter on No. FDA-2012-N-0882 Generic Drug User Fees, 3
(Nov. 16, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-2012-N-0882-0049.
139. Center for Health Equity, Research, & Promotion, Comment Letter on Generic
Drug User Fees No. FDA-2012-N-0882 (June 10, 2015), https://www.regulations.gov/docu
ment?D=FDA-2012-N-0882-0031.
140. Kaiser Permanente, Written Testimony of Dr. Sharon Levine on Generic Drug User Fee
Amendments of 2012, at 3 (July 15, 2015), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-
2012-N-0882-0025.
141. Id. at 6.
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B. PDUFA VI
The PDUFA framework is far more detailed and extensive than the
GDUFA framework. PDUFA has the advantage of a longer history, but it
also benefits from the branded drug industry’s ability to pay user fees suffi-
cient to support extensive hiring at the FDA. The large stakeholder com-
munity that engages with the FDA during PDUFA reauthorizations also
likely contributes to focusing the FDA’s attention on branded drugs.
1. Provisions
The resource differential between the generic and branded drug indus-
tries is visible even in the format of the public comments submitted to the
FDA during the Commitment Letter negotiation process. Nearly all
branded drug companies’ comments appear on letterhead, written by regula-
tory affairs teams or lobbyists, while some of the generic companies’ com-
ment are simply typed into the Regulations.gov submissions page without
formal signatures.142 The resource differential likely supported branded
manufacturers’ successful development of extensive communication proto-
cols with the FDA during the application process, which provides numerous
opportunities to correct or clarify applications143 and has established rapid
approval timelines that the FDA adheres to closely.
Although reviewing clinical trial data to assess new drugs for approval
is significantly more complex than assessing bioequivalence and safe manu-
facturing for generics, PDUFA VI’s performance goal for standard new
drugs is ten months: the same as for standard generics.144 The FDA’s new
approval goal for priority new drug applications is six months, two months
faster than the less complex priority generic applications.145
The FDA held two public meetings, six meetings with stakeholder
groups, and over fifty discussions with industry leading up to the most re-
cent reauthorization.146 Negotiators for industry and the FDA worked
through fine details of the FDA-industry communication process and ham-
142. Compare ASTRAZENECA PHARMACEUTICALS LP, RESPONSE TO FDA REQUEST FOR COM -
MENTS, PDUFA REAUTHORIZATION PERFORMANCE GOALS AND PROCEDURES FISCAL YEARS 2018
THROUGH 2022 (Aug. 4, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-2016-N-
1895-0002, with Karen Vescovi, Comment Letter on Generic Drug User Fees No. FDA-
2012-N-0882 (Oct. 20, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-2012-N-
0882-0043.
143. PDUFA LETTER, supra note 14, at 4.
144. Id. at 4; GDUFA II LETTER, supra note 14, at 5.
145. PDUFA LETTER, supra note 14, at 4; GDUFA II LETTER, supra note 14, at 5.
146. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., PDUVA VI: FISCAL YEARS 2018-2022, http://www.fda.gov/
ForIndustry/UserFees/PrescriptionDrugUserFee/ucm446608.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2018).
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mered out industry’s push for “real world” evidence.147 PDUFA VI features
extensive procedural guidance for communication between branded drug
makers and the FDA.148 The Commitment Letter describes particular
materials and issues to discuss at each step of the branded drug approval
process, proposing that the communication cycle be formally set out be-
tween each applicant and review team.149 For the fast track program appli-
cable to breakthrough therapies, industry receives “intensive FDA guidance
on an efficient drug development program, and an organization commit-
ment by [the] FDA involving senior managers.”150
The FDA proposes to add 230 full time staff to aid the branded drug
review process over PDUFA VI at a cost of over $75 million.151 This mas-
sive increase in staff for branded drugs renders it unlikely that generic
drugs will be able to compete effectively for the FDA’s attention without
supplementary resources like this Note proposes.
2. Stakeholders
The public comments on the most recent reauthorization of PDUFA
reflect the broad stakeholder community that engages with the FDA to de-
velop the branded drug approval program. Healthcare and patient advocates
and providers have a substantial presence in the conversation as demon-
strated by the volume of comments submitted.
147. PDUFA LETTER, supra note 14, at 4.
148. Id.
149. Id.; Prescription Drug User Fee Act: Request for Comments, 81 Fed. Reg. 46,929,
46,929-30 (July 19, 2016).
150. PDUFA LETTER, supra note 14, at 22.
151. Prescription Drug User Fee Act: Request for Comments, 81 Fed. Reg. at 46,934-
35.
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FIGURE 2.152 PDUFA VI COMMENTS FROM PUBLIC MEETING
ON COMMITMENT LETTER
The FDA receives significantly more engagement from patient advo-
cates and health-focused groups when negotiating the branded drug ap-
proval program than when negotiating the generic drug approval program.
Branded drugs are critical for patients suffering from conditions with few or
no treatment options, which likely contributes to the patient-focused en-
gagement in PDUFA. However, this engagement often aligns with branded
drug research and manufacturing firms’ interests, creating an additional
source of pressure on the FDA to prioritize the branded drug review.153
One example of this effective coordination is the provision for “real-
world evidence” in PDUFA VI, which draws united support from patient
advocates and pioneer drug firms.154 The FDA “proposes to conduct one or
more public workshops” on how to gather and use “real-world” evidence in
determining safety and effectiveness of medications.155 Pharmaceutical Re-
search and Manufacturers of America, the branded drug trade group, ap-
plauds the plan to use patient experiences and “patient-reported outcomes”
to contribute to regulatory decision-making.156 If the FDA was regularly
hearing from a similarly broad and engaged base of stakeholders consist-
152. Figure 2 is based on my categorization of comments submitted in response to
Prescription Drug User Fee Act: Request for Comments, 81 Fed. Reg. at 46,929.
153. Thomas, supra note 106.
154. Prescription Drug User Fee Act: Request for Comments, 81 Fed. Reg. at 46,933.
155. Id.
156. Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, Comment Letter on
Docket No. FDA-2016-N-1895-0038: Prescription Drug User Fee Act; Public Meeting; Re-
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ently pushing the agency to think about generic drugs and stay accountable
to generic drug approval commitments, generic drugs will cement their sta-
tus as equals to branded drugs within the FDA.
CONCLUSION
A sustainably funded generic drug approval system that targets the
most impactful generic drug approvals for funding would be valuable for
under-resourced patient groups, the health system, the country as a whole,
and particularly under-resourced communities. Delays in the FDA’s reviews
of generic drugs pose a significant risk to the public health, particularly now
that many health insurance plans come with multi-thousand -dollar
deductibles.157
The FDA’s FAQs on drug approval includes “What can the FDA do
about the cost of drugs?”158 The FDA’s provided answer is that the “FDA
has no legal authority to investigate or control the prices charged for mar-
keted drugs . . . [the] FDA recognizes that other factors beyond its purview,
including insurance coverage and drug pricing, can determine patient access
to drugs.”159 Adding insurer funding to support generic drug approval at the
FDA would help the FDA improve patient access to drugs. Creating this
additional funding stream would also allow the FDA to focus its generic
drug program development on speed and efficiency, instead of balancing
responsibility to pay fees among generic industry participants. The entire
health system will benefit from three changes. First, the FDA must identify
the drugs most in need of generic competition to promote medication ad-
herence and avoid preventable complications and treatment. Second, insurer
funding support will ensure user fees do not make it hard for those generic
drugs to get to market. Finally, the FDA must be regularly reminded by an
engaged stakeholder community that approving generic drugs quickly is just
as important as approving branded drugs quickly.
quest for Comments (Aug. 22, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-2016-
N-1895-0038.
157. Shefali Luthra, Even With ‘Skin in the Game,’ Health Care Shoppers Are Not More
Savvy, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Jan. 19, 2016), http://khn.org/news/even-with-skin-in-the-game-
health-care-shoppers-are-not-more-savvy/.
158. Frequently Asked Questions about CDER, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/
AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProductsandTobacco/CDER/FAQsabout
CDER/#16 (last visited Mar. 8, 2018).
159. Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MEA\7-2\MEA205.txt unknown Seq: 26 26-APR-18 11:38
446 Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law [Vol. 7:2
